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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
This is a Petition for Review of the Industrial Commission's
February 18, 1992 Order Denying Petitioner's Motion for Review
alleging

entitlement

to

permanent,

total

disability

sustained as a result of an industrial accident.

benefits

A Petition for

Review of that Order was timely filed with this Court on March 17,
1992.
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this Petition for Review
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53(2) (1988), 351-86 (1988), 63-46b-16 (1988), and 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1988); and Rule
14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE(S)/STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
There are three substantial issues presented for review:
(1) whether Mr. Willardson suffered a compensable industrial
accident;
(2)

whether the Administrative Law Judge applied the wrong

standard of proof to Petitioner's injuries; and,
(3)

whether the Industrial Commission abused its discretion

by failing to convene a Medical Panel.
The standard of appellate review which is to be applied to the
resolution of the above issues is one involving "correction of
error", since they involve questions of law, and no deference to
the agency's view of the law is required.
Procedures Act, Utah
(1988).

Code Annotated,

Utah Administrative

Section

63-46b-16(4)

(d)

Mor-Flo Industries v. Board of Review, 817 P.2d 328 (Utah
1

1991)•

Morton International, Inc. v. Auditing Division of the Utah

State Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991).
Furthermore, in reviewing the proceedings below and the scope
of the Utah Workers Compensation Act, it is important to recognize
that the Act is to be liberally construed and any doubt as to
compensation is to be resolved in favor of the Petitioner.

State

Tax Commission v. Industrial Commission, 685 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah
1984).

McPhie v. Industrial Commission, 567 P.2d 153, 155 (Utah

1977) .

DETERMINATIVE STATUTE/RULE
Utah

Code Annotated,

Section

35-1-77(1) (a)

(1988)

is the

determinative statute in this case. Rule 490-1-9 of the Industrial
Commission's administrative rules is also applicable. They are set
forth in full in the Addendum thereto as Exhibit A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. Willardson seeks review of the Industrial Commission Order
denying his Motion for Review wherein he alleged entitlement to
permanent,

total

disability

compensation

occasioned

by

his

industrial accident.
Course of Proceedings
Mr.

Willardson

filed

an application

for permanent, total

disability compensation benefits sustained as the result of an
industrial injury on or about April 15, 1988.
2

(R. at 8 ) .

None of

the parties disputed that Mr. Willardson is disabled (R. at 10,
74); however, the Respondents alleged that Mr. Willardson did not
sustain a compensable industrial injury and is thus not entitled to
permanent, total disability benefits.

(R. at 10).

A hearing was

held on February 26, 1991. (R. at 17).
Disposition Below
On March 18, 1991 the Administrative Law Judge held that
Petitioner had failed to demonstrate medical causation and that his
symptoms and disability after April 15, 1988 were the result of
pre-existing

conditions

with

no

contribution

from

the

work

activities of April 15, 1988. A Medical Panel was not appointed to
examine Mr. Willardson or review his medical records.
for permanent, total

disability

His claim

benefits was dismissed

prejudice for failure to establish medical causation.

with

(R. at 19-

28, copy attached to Addendum as Exhibit B ) .
He filed a Motion for Review with the Industrial Commission
which was subsequently denied on February 18, 1992. (R. at 74-79,
copy attached to Addendum as Exhibit C) . He challenges that final
agency action in this Petition for Review.
Statement of the Facts
At the time of his industrial accident on April 15, 1988, Mr.
Willardson was 57 years old and employed by Beaver Creek Coal
Company as a Belt Supervisor.

(R. at 20) .

That job involved

maintaining a conveyor belt that was approximately 1 and 1/2 miles
long. The belt was mostly waist-high, but was shoulder high for a
portion of its total length, and was three (3) feet overhead in
3

places.

Mr. Willardson's duties required him to keep the belt

clean, primarily by shoveling under the rollers to keep debris from
building up.

(R. at 20) .

On April 15, 1988, Mr. Willardson was engaged in "regarding"
the belt, which involved replacing wire mesh guards that were
fastened to the belt lengthwise and are designed to prevent rock
from falling off the belt. He had never previously performed this
activity.

The guards are made of heavy wire mesh and were

approximately

4

feet

by

8

feet

in

dimension,

and

weighed

approximately 20-25 pounds each. They were stacked in packages of
50 to 100 and bound together with straps. To reguard the belt, the
guards needed to be carried from the stack over to the belt and
then fastened to the belt, using wire and pliers.

(R. at 21) .

While attempting to pick up one of the screens from a stack, Mr.
Willardson found that it was stuck and that he would have to jerk
it loose. He bent over at the waist and grabbed onto the guard on
top of the stack and jerked on it while straightening up and
stepping back at the same time. As he jerked it, pulling it up and
away from the stack, he felt a sharp pain about at the level of his
belt line in his low back. (R. at A-l).
Due to the severity of the pain, he immediately laid down flat
on his back and was found laying on the ground by another employee,
Mr.

Owen Hunt.

Mr. Hunt helped

him

up

and

into a shack

approximately 6 to 8 feet away. When the pain did not subside and
in fact had increased, Mr. Willardson concluded that he would be
unable to remain at work.

He showered, and with some difficulty,
4

got out of his work clothes and got dressed.

Mr. Hunt helped him

into his (Hunt's) van and drove him to a Chiropractor, Dr. Sanders.
Dr. Sanders declined to treat him and referred him to the Emery
medical Center.

(R. at 21,22, A-l).

Mr. Willardson was seen by Dr. C. Kotrady at the Emery Medical
Center that same day.

(R. at 22, A-2) . Dr. Kotrady's Physician's

Initial Report of Work Injury noted that Mr. Willardson had right
hip pain in a number of different places, and contained a diagnosis
of right hip pain, severe degenerative arthritis - hips, peilvis and
lumbar spine, with degenerative disc disease at all levels of the
lumbar spine with scoliosis present.

(R. A-2 at 11.5).

Dr.

Kotrady indicated that Mr. Willardson7s condition was the result of
an industrial injury, but noted that there was also evidence of
degenerative arthritis and disc disease pre-existing this injury.
(R. A-2 at 11.5).

Dr. Kotrady initially felt that Mr. Willardson

could return to work as of April 25, 1988.

(R. A-2 at 11.5).

When leaving Dr. Kotrady's office on April 19, 1988 for a
follow up visit, Mr. Willardson "felt something twist and pull in
his hip and the hip pain reoccurred".

He was unable to stand in a

line at a scout meeting that evening because of worsening pain.
That pain became markedly worse when he stooped over to take some
clothes out of the dryer on April 23, 1988.

(R. A-4 at 25).

On April 23, 1988, Mr. Willardson was admitted to Castleview
Hospital for low back pain.

The Admit History and Physical Exam

report indicates that he had chronic low back pain, but that after
recovery from a 1970 injury and surgery that he was OK with just
5

occasional low back discomfort and had not experienced any loss of
work time.

(R. A-4 at 25) .

He was treated conservatively and

discharged on April 30, 1988. The Discharge Summary indicates that
he seemed to improve, but had reached a plateau and still had
significant pain and discomfort in the hip with minimal ambulatory
functioning.

(R. A-4 at 25).

Mr. Willardson followed up with Dr. David R. Heiner after
release from the hospital, and was referred by him to Dr. L.
Gaufin, a neurologist in Provo, Utah.

On May 5, 1988, after an

initial examination, Dr. Gaufin reported his findings as: (1) acute
lumbar radiculopathy L4-5, L3-4, right, secondary to degenerative
disc and joint disease with disc protrusion at L3-4, L4-5, right,
secondary

to

degenerative

disc

and

joint

disease

with

disc

protrusion at L3-4, L4-5, right greater than left and (2) chronic
osteoarthritis and degenerative disc and joint disease Ll-2, L2-3,
L3-4, L4-5 L5-S1 bilaterally.

Dr. Gaufin noted that the lumbar

radiculopathy was secondary to the work-related injury on April 15,
1988.

(R. A-6 at 58-59).

Mr. Willardson continued to be followed up by Dr. Heiner
approximately every month or two through February 1990. There was
never any real change in his overall condition or symptoms during
this period, although routine events would sometimes exacerbate the
pain causing it to increase in intensity for a period of time. (R.
A-2 at 48-51) .
after the

Mr. Willardson was never able to return to work

industrial

injury and was awarded

Social Security

Disability beginning as of April 15, 1988, the date of his
6

industrial accident. (R. A-12).
Both Dr. Gaufin and Dr. Heiner completed Summary of Medical
Record reports in September, 1988 and accessed impairment ratings
for Mr. Willardson. Dr. Heiner gave him a 30% whole person rating,
with 50% of that being due to pre-existing conditions and 50% due
to the April 15, 1988 industrial injury.

(R. A-5 at 42, 46). Dr.

Gaufin gave him a 15% whole person rating, with 50% being due to
pre-existing

conditions

industrial injury.

and

50% due

(R. A-6 at 60).

to

the April

15, 1988

The Respondents did not have

Mr. Willardson examined by a physician of their own choosing and
did not present any contrary medical evidence. The Administrative
Law Judge did not refer Mr. Willardson to a Medical Panel.
Petitionees claim for permanent total disability benefits was
dismissed with prejudice by the Administrative Law Judge on March
18, 1991 for failure to establish medical causation (R. at 19-28).
He filed a Motion for Review with the Industrial Commission on
April 17, 1991 ( R. at 29-31), but it was denied on February 18,
1992.

(R. at 74-79).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT(S)
The Petitioner sustained a compensable industrial injury on
April 15, 1988 while in the employ of Respondent Beaver Creek Coal
Co.

That injury was severe enough to require immediate medical

treatment and prevent him from being able to return to work after
that injury.

Both of the Doctors who examined and treated Mr.

Willardson found that he had sustained an industrial injury and
7

that

it was

responsible

for

at

least

half

of

his

resulting

permanent total disability status.
The

Respondents

did

not

provide

any

conflicting

medical

testimony or documentation and despite the fact that the disability
ratings assessed by Petitioner's two doctors varied by more than
5%, (they actually varied by 15%), the Administrative Law Judge did
not refer this matter to a Medical Panel.
This

Court

Commission's

should

determination

summarily
that

reverse

Petitioner

the

did

Industrial

not

establish

medical causation and remand with instructions to enter an award
establishing that fact.

In the alternative, this matter should be

remanded with instructions to the Industrial Commission to convene
a Medical Panel to examine the medical causation issue.

ARGUMENT
I
THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT IS TO BE APPLIED LIBERALLY
IN FAVOR OF AWARDING BENEFITS AND ALL DOUBTS AS TO
COVERAGE ARE TO BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE INJURED
WORKER.
Few principles

of workers7

compensation

law

are as well

established in this State as that workers' compensation disability
claims are to be liberally construed in favor of awarding benefits,
and any doubts raised from the evidence are to be resolved in favor
of the claim.

Utah Courts have consistently

principle from 1919 to the present.

reiterated

this

Heaton v. Second Injury Fund,

796 P.2d 676 (Utah 1990); State v. Industrial Commission, supra.,
J & W Janitorial Co. v. Industrial Commission, 661 P.2d 949 (Utah
8

1983); Prows v. Industrial Commission, 610 P.2d 1362 (Utah 1980);
McPhie v. Industrial Commission, supra.; Baker v. Industrial
Commission,

405

P.2d

613

(Utah

1965);

Askrew

v.

Industrial

Commission, 391 P.2d 302 (Utah 1964); M & K Corp. v. Industrial
Commission, 189 P.2d 132 (Utah 1948); and Chandler v. Industrial
Commission, 184 P. 1020 (Utah 1919).
The Utah Supreme Court in Chandler, supra, discussed the
proper construction of the Workers7 Compensation Act and the
underlying purposes of the Act, and stated as follows:
We are also reminded that our statute requires that
the statues of this state are to be 'liberally construed
with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to
promote justice.7
*

*

*

*

*

*

In this connection it must be remembered that the
compensation provided for in the act is in no sense to be
considered as damages for the injured employee or to his
dependents in case death supervenes.
The right to
compensation arises out of the relation existing between
employer and employee, and that the injury arises out of
[or] in the course of the employment. Under such an act
the costs and expenses of conducting the business or
enterprise, including compensation for injuries to
x
employees or other casualties, must be taxed to the
business. The theory of the Compensation Act is that the
whole cost and expense of conducting the business as
aforesaid is added to the cost of the articles that are
produced and sold, and hence, in the long run, such costs
and expenses are borne by the public; that is, by the
consumers of the articles produced. The purpose of such
an act, therefore, is to protect the employee and those
dependent upon him, and in case of his serious injury or
death to provide adequate means for the support of those
dependent upon him. In view, therefore, that in case of
total disability or death of the employee his dependents
might become the objects of public charity, such a
calamity is avoided by requiring the business or
enterprise to provide for such dependents, with the right
of the employer to add the amount that is paid out to the
cost of producing and selling the product of such
business or enterprise. The beneficent purpose of such
acts are therefore apparent to all, and for that reason,
if for no other, should receive a very liberal
9

construction in favor of the injured employee. We are
all united upon the proposition that in view of the
purposes of such acts, in case there is any doubt
respecting the right to compensation, such doubt should
be resolved in favor of the employee or his dependents as
the case may be. Id, at 1021-1022. (Emphasis added)
The Administrative Law Judge in rendering her Findings of Fact
and

Conclusions

of Law

failed

to apply this vital rule of

construction. Nowhere in her Findings or Conclusions is there any
evidence of a "liberal construction" or the "resolution of doubt in
favor of the claim". Whenever any doubt or uncertainty appears in
the record, the Administrative Law Judge construed it against the
injured

employee which

is contrary

to the correct statutory

construction required in a workers compensation case.
In light of the Administrative Law Judge's casual disregard of
the

findings

of the only two Doctors who presented

medical

evidence, the absence of any medical evidence supporting her
Findings or refuting Petitioner's physicians, the finding of a lack
of medical causation, for the reasons set forth below, is simply
not supported by the record.
Order is thus flawed.

The entire underlying basis of the

The "findings" and "conclusions" do not

evidence "humane and beneficent purposes" as required by law. The
entire Order should be disregarded due to this conceptional flaw.

II
THE PETITIONER SUSTAINED AN INJURY BY REASON OF AN
INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT IN THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT,
The

law

is

clear

and

overwhelming

that

the

Workman's

Compensation Act is to be applied liberally and in favor of
10

awarding benefits, with all doubts as to coverage being resolved in
favor of the injured worker. Heaton v. Second Injury Fund, supra.
This principle of construction is not only to be applied to the
application of law, but also to the reasonable inferences which can
be drawn from the facts.

The Petitioner is entitled to have all

doubts as to whether he sustained a compensable industrial injury
as a result of the events of April 15, 1988 resolved in his favor.
The evidence that Petitioner suffered an industrial injury on
that date was overwhelming and largely unrefuted other than by
innuendo. The Respondents base their argument that a compensable
injury did not occur on that date on the Administrative Law Judges
conclusion that "[Petitioner's] symptoms and disability after April
15, 1988 were the result of his long-standing and significant
degenerative condition of his lumbar spine and were not the result
of any significant contribution by activities of April 15, 1988."
(R. at 26) .

This argument begs the question and fails to apply

clearly delineated standards as to what constitutes a "compensable
injury".
In order to establish that he has suffered a compensable
injury under the Workers' Compensation Act, the Petitioner need
only show that the injury must have occurred by accident; and there
must be a causal connection between the injury and the claimant's
employment activities.

Sisco Hilte v. Industrial Commission. 766

P.2d 1089, 190 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
In the landmark case of Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729
P.2d 15 (Utah 1986), the Supreme Court defined what constitutes an
11

accident under Workers7 Compensation Act.

The Court held as

follows:
For purpose of worker,s compensation, the key requirement
of an 'accident' is that the occurrence be unanticipated,
unplanned and unintended; where either cause of injury or
result of exertion is different from what would normally
be expected to occur, occurrence is unplanned,
unforeseen, and unintended and, thus, by 'accident'. Id.
at 21.
The Petitioner testified that he suffered an industrial
accident when he injured himself attempting to pick up a 25-pound
metal screen.

The sudden jerking to free the screen was the

precipitating event which created the back pain.

His version of

the events was supported by co-workers and was never rebutted by
Respondents. The evidence is overwhelming that on April 15, 1988,
Petitioner suffered an industrial accident.
There is no requirement that the accident result in immediate
and debilitating injury, only that in cases involving the presence
of pre-existing

conditions that it involve some unusual and

extraordinary exertion.

(Allen, supra.) In this case, as a result

of an accident, Petitioner indisputably engaged in unusual and
extraordinary exertion. He did sustain an accident as that term is
defined in the act.
Petitioner has admitted that he has "a history of prior back
injuries and has been undeniably suffering from moderate to severe
arthritic changes in his lumbar spine and pelvis." (R. at 36).
However, just because a person suffers a pre-existing condition, he
or

she

is

not

disqualified

from

obtaining

compensation.

"Compensation is not dependant on the state of an employee's health
12

or his freedom from constitutional weakness or latent temdency."
Denver v. Hansen, 650 P.2d 1319, 1321 (Colo. App., 1982).

The

clear law of this state is that "the aggravation or lighting up of
a preexisting disease by an industrial accident is compensable...."
Powers v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d 140, 143-44, 427 P.2d
740, 743 (1967) (quoted with approval in Allen, id.).
There was no medical evidence offered at the hearing which
would

suggest

that

Petitioner's

injuries were

not

at

least

partially the result of the industrial accident. In fact, both of
the

examining

doctors

assigned

one-half

injuries to the industrial accident.

of

the

Petitioner's

The Respondents fciiled to

offer any conflicting medical evidence.

The Administrative Law

Judge simply cannot arbitrarily discount competent, uncontradicted
evidence indicating that the industrial injury was the cause of
Petitioner's present permanent, total disability.

Kaiser Steel

Corp. v. Industrial Commission., 709 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1985). FritoLay, Inc. v. Jacobs, 689 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1984).
If there was any failure to find a medical/industrial cause of
the injuries Petitioner demonstrates, such failure resulted from
the Administrative Law Judge's failure to empanel a medical panel,
as argued below.
The actual Findings of Fact portion of the Order in this
matter

are grossly

requirements.

inadequate

and do not meet recent legal

Such summary conclusions do not constitute proper

fact-finding.

13

In the recent case of Adams v. Board of Review, 821 P.2d 1
(Utah Ct. App. 1991), the Court stated as follows:
While the purported "Findings of Fact written by the
A.L.J, contain an informative summary of the evidence
presented, such a rehearsal of contradictory evidence
does not constitute findings of fact. In order for a
finding to truly constitute a "finding of fact," it must
indicate what the A.L.J, determines in fact occurred....
The evidence did not merely indicate two possible
versions of a fact whereby we could conclude that the
denial of benefits necessarily indicates that the
Commission accepted one version over another.
The
evidence shows several possible configurations and
degrees of injury and/or disease, if any, and the causes,
if any, thereby creating a matrix of possible factual
findings. A mere summary of the conflicting evidence in
this case therefore does not give a clear indication of
the A.L.J.'s or the Commission's view as to what in fact
occurred.
Since we cannot even determine why the
Commission found there was no causation shown, we clearly
cannot assume that the Commission actually made any of
the possible subsidiary findings.
The findings are
therefore inadequate. Id. at 20.
The

Findings

made

by

the Administrative

Law

Judge

are

deficient in that they fail to address in detail the issue of
medical causation.

The absence of a Medical Panel report makes

this failure even more glaring.

Although none of the parties,

including the Administrative Law Judge, dispute that Petitioner is
permanently and totally disabled, the Administrative Law Judge did
not specify the degree to which that disability was caused by the
1988 industrial injury.

The Administrative Law Judge spends a

great deal of time discussing Petitioner's prior medical problems,
but does not make concise findings as to Petitioner's current
medical condition and the causes for it.

This failure was

undoubtedly compounded by the Administrative Law Judges unwarranted
refusal to submit the matter to a Medical Panel as complained
14

below, and that

failure manifests

itself here

in inadequate

findings.
The

Utah

Court

of

Appeals

has

recently

informed

this

Commission that:
In order for us to meaningfully review the findings of
the Commission, the findings must be 'sufficiently
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose
the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each
factual issue was reached.' Action v. Deliran, 737 P.2d
996 999 (Utah 1987) (quoting Rucker v. DaIton, 598 P.2d
1336 (Utah 1979)) . .. [T]he failure of an agency to intake
adequate findings of fact on material issues renders its
findings 'arbitrary and capricious' unless the evidence
is 'clear, uncontroverted and capable of only one
conclusion.' Id. (quoting Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d
233, 236 (Utah 1983)).
Nyrehn v. Industrial Commission, 800 P.2d 330, 335 (Utah App.
1990), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991).
The Administrative Law Judge's purported Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order should at a minimum be vacated and a
new Order entered with detailed and subsidiary facts to disclose
the steps by which the ultimate conclusion was reached. Failure to
do so, denies Petitioner the ability to marshal the evidence in
support of the findings and show that it is not substantial. Grace
Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P. 2d 63, 67-68 (Utah App.
1989).

Ill
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE APPLIED THE WRONG STANDARD
OF PROOF TO THE PETITIONER'S INJURIES.
The Administrative Law Judge based her finding of "no medical
causation" on the finding that the Petitioner's "symptoms and
15

disability after April 15, 1988 were the result of his longstanding and significant degenerative condition in his lumbar spine
and were not the result of any significant contribution by the
activities of April 15, 1988." (emphasis added) (R. at 26).
There is no requirement in the Workers' Compensation Act that
the work-related activities "significantly" contribute to an injury
in order for a compensable industrial accident to occur. Case law
is overwhelming that the only requirement is that there be a
medical and legal relationship between the Petitioner's symptoms
and work-related activities, significant or otherwise.

Ostler v.

Industrial Commission, 84 Utah 428, 46 P.2d 95 (1934).
In like regard is Larson, Workman's Compensation Law, Section
12.26 at 3-480-481: "The relative contribution of the accident and
the prior disease is not weighed,...."

The only requirement is

that the work-related event be a contributing cause of the injury;
it not be a significant contribution.

Higgins v. Industrial

Commission. 700 P.2d 704 (Utah 1985).
Respondents, Beaver Creek and CIGNA, have conceded that the
Administrative Law Judge erred in the use of "no significant
contribution" as an evidentiary standard, and allege that she could
have stopped with a mere negative finding of any contribution. (R.
at 56).
find

While that may be the case, it is clear that she did not

that

there

was

"no

contribution"

but

rather

that

the

contribution was not "significant".
The Administrative Law Judge displayed

confusion

in the

invocation of the "clear and convincing evidence" standard.
16

At

times the Judge refers to a "preponderance" but at other times she
seems to require proof by "clear and convincing" evidence.

The

applicable standard is that of "preponderance of the evidence" and
not

"clear and convincing," evidence.

Commission.

592

P.2d

616

(Utah

1979).

Lipman v. Industrial
In

addition,

the

Administrative Law Judge applied the wrong standard of proof under
Allen, supra. because the higher burden of proof is inapplicable to
this case since the risk brought to the work place was incurred by
working for the same employer as distinguished from any personal
risk brought to the work place by the Petitioner.

Fred Meyer v.

Industrial Commission. 800 P.2d 825 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
And finally, the Administrative Law Judge selectively chose
only a single day's activities of April 15, 1988 in order to
determine whether a compensable injury had occurred as opposed to
reviewing the repetitive cause and cumulative effects of the
Petitioner's employment history with the same employer over several
years.

Petitioner was entitled to have the entire scope of his

employment history weighed rather than just one isolated day.
Stouffer Foods Corp. v. Industrial Commission. 801 P.2d 179 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990). Nyrehn v. Industrial Commission, supra. Miera v.
Industrial Commission. 728 P.2d 1023 (Utah 1986).

IV
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ABUSED HER DISCRETION IN NOT
REFERRING THIS MATTER TO A MEDICAL PANEL TO ASSIST IN THE
RESOLUTION OF THE MEDICAL CAUSATION ISSUES.

17

Utah Code Annotatedy Section 35-1-77(1)(a) (1988) reads as
follows:
Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for injury by
accident, or for death, arising out of or in the course
of employment,, and if the employer or its insurance
carrier denies liability, the commission may refer the
medical aspects of the case to a medical panel appointed
by the commission.
In response to Petitioner's claim that despite requests by
counsel, the Administrative Law Judge failed and/or refused to
refer this matter to a medical panel, Respondent Utah Industrial
Commission

in its Order Denying Motion for Review states as

follows:
Appointment of a medical panel is within the sound
discretion of the ALJ as limited by U.C.A. Section 35-177 (1953 as amended), and R490-1-9 (Utah Admin. Code
1992) . Since there was no credible conflicting medical
evidence, the ALJ did not err in making her decision not
to appoint a medical panel. (R. at 107).
While that argument might have some merit in the initial
formulation of policy, it has none in the execution of the policy
presently contained

in statute, rules and regulations.

Utah

Industrial Commission Rule R568-1-9 governing the "necessity of
submitting a case to a medical panel" provided in relevant part as
follows:
Pursuant to Section 35-1-77, U.C.A., the commission
adopts the following guidelines in determining the
necessity of submitting a case to a medical panel:
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative
Law Judge where:
1. One or more significant medical issues may be
involved. Generally a significant medical issue must be
shown by conflicting medical reports.
Significant
medical issues are involved when there are:
18

(a) Conflicting medical reports of permanent
physical impairment which vary more than 5% of the whole
person,
(b)
Conflicting medical opinions as to the
temporary total cutoff date which vary more than 90 days,
and/or
(c) Medical expenses in controversy amounting to
more than $2,000.... See Addendum, Exhibit A.
The Rule mandatorily requires that a panel "will" be used when
"one or more significant medical issues may be involved".

The rule

does not, as Respondents seem to suggest, give the Administrative
Law Judge unbridled discretion to determine the existence of such
issues, but rather definitively states that "Significant medical
issues

are

involved

where

there

are:

(a) conflicting

medical

reports of permanent physical impairment which vary more than 5% of
the whole person...."
It

can

not

be

disputed

that

this

case

clearly

contains

conflicting medical reports of permanent physical impairment which
vary by more than 5% of the whole person.

Dr. Gaufin rated the

Petitioner at 15% impairment of the whole person (R. A-5 at 42,
46) , while Dr. Heiner indicated that he had a 30% whole person
rating

(R. A-6 at 60), a difference of 15%.

Both physicians

divided the Petitioner's permanent impairment as 50% industrial and
50% pre-existing.
It little matters that Respondents do not believe that the
doctor's ratings are not credible. Indeed, they should be estopped
from such an argument due to their failure to request their own
consultative medical examination.

The Rule does not Sciy that

referral will occur only when the Administrative Law Judge finds
19

that there are "credible conflicting medical reports;" rather it
states that referral will occur when there are "conflicting medical
reports". (emphasis added).

It is, in fact, to determine the

credibility of the initial medical reports that referrals are
required to medical panels when there is more than a 5% variance in
the impairment ratings.
Respondent CIGNA's attorney in his Answer is correct when he
states; "Now, I am no doctor..." (R. at 54).

Neither is the

Administrative Law Judge. That is why referral to a medical panel
in such cases is required and the failure to do so is more than an
abuse of discretion-it is plain error.

See Lipman v. Industrial

Commission, supra and Schmidt v. Industrial Commission. 617 P.2d
693

(Utah 1980) interpreting the former Utah Code Annotated,

Section 35-1-77

(1953) which made referrals to medical panels

mandatory in cases of denied liability.
Although reference to a medical panel under Utah Code
Annotated, Section 35-1-77 (1988) is discretionary, that discretion
is not unrestricted and has been made mandatory by the Commission's
own Rules and Regulations (Utah Admin. Code R568-1-9). The failure
to refer a matter to a Medical Panel when such referral is
mandatory

is plain error. "In some cases, such as where the

evidence of causal connection between the work-related event and
the injury is uncertain or highly technical, failure to refer the
case to a medical panel may be an abuse of discretion."

Champion

Home Builders v. Industrial Commission, 703 P.2d 306, 308 (Utah
1985).

See also Hone v. J.F. Shea Co.. 728 P. 2d 1008 (Utah 1986).
20

In this case, the causal connection between the work-related
injury and the Applicant's permanent, total disability, if not
clear, was at least uncertain and failure to refer the matter to a
medical panel was error.

The Order Denying Motion for Review

should at the least be reversed and the matter remanded with
directions to refer the matter to a medical panel since failure to
do was in direct conflict with Industrial Commission practice and
rule.

The failure to obtain a Medical Panel opinion resulted in

the Administrative Law Judge lacking essential and necessary
information to adjudicate Petitioner's claim.

CONCLUSION/STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT
Based upon the foregoing it is respectfully submitted that the
Industrial Commission erred when it entered its February 18, 1992
Order dismissing Mr. Willardson's claim for permanent, total
disability

benefits

for

lack

of

medical

causation.

The

uncontroverted evidence submitted to the Industrial Commission
supports the finding that he sustained a significant permanent,
partial impairment due to his 1988 industrial accident, and is
permanently and totally disabled due to his industrial injury. To
the extent there is any doubt or confusion as to medical causation,
it was error for the Administrative Law Judge not to convene a
medical panel.
Therefore, it is respectfully requested that this Court remand
this case to the Industrial Commission with instructions to either
award him benefits based on the uncontroverted facts and medical
21

evidence presented, or in the alternative, to convene a medical
panel.
DATED this 26th day of October, 1092.

Attorneyjs for Petiitioijer
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PROOF OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the foregoing
Brief of Petitioner were mailed, postage prepaid, on this 26th day
of October, 1992 to the following:
Utah Court of Appeals
(1 original & 7 copies)
400 Midtown Plaza
230 South 500 East, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Benjamin A. Sims, Esq.
Industrial Commission of Utah
160 South 300 East
Post Office Box 510250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250

(4 copies)

Erie V. Boorman, Esq.
EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE FUND
P.O. Box 510250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250

(4 copies)

Robert J. Shaugnessy, Esq.
1800 South West Temple Suite 407
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115

(4 copies)

Kerry L. Willardson
P.O. Box 209
Castle Dale, Utah 84513

(1 copy)

File

VIRS^HTOS DABNEY, HS{
Attorneys for Retitionlers

i
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ADDENDUM
EXHIBIT A:

Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-77(1)(a) (1988)
Utah Administrative Code R568-1-9.

EXHIBIT B:

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
(March 18, 1991).

EXHIBIT C;

Order Denying Motion for Review (February 18, 1992) .
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35-1-77. Medical panel — Medical director or medical consultants —
Discretionary authority of commission to refer case — Findings and reports —
Objections to report — Hearing — Expenses. (Last amended 1991)
(1) (a) Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for injury by
accident, or for death, arising out of and in the course of employment, and if
the employer or its insurance carrier denies liability, the commission may
refer the medical aspects of the case to a medical panel appointed by the
commission.
(b) When a claim for compensation based upon disability or death due to
an occupational disease is filed with the commission, the commission shall,
except upon stipulation of all parties, appoint an impartial medical panel.
(c) A medical panel shall consist of one or more physicians specializing
in the treatment of the disease or condition involved in the claim.
(d) As an alternative method of obtaining an impartial medical evaluation
of the medical aspects of a controverted case, the commission in its sole
discretion may employ a medical director or medical consultants on a full-time
or part-time basis for the purpose of evaluating the medical evidence and
advising the commission with respect to its ultimate fact-finding
responsibility. If all parties agree to the use of a medical director or
medical consultants, they shall be allowed to function in the same manner and
under the same procedures as required of a medical panel.
(2) (a) The medical panel, medical director, or medical consultants shall
make such study, take such X-rays, and perform such tests, including
post-mortem examinations if authorized by the commission, as it may determine
to be necessary or desirable.
(b) The medical panel, medical director, or medical consultants shall
make a report in writing to the commission in a form prescribed by the
commission, and also make such additional findings as the commission may
require. In occupational disease cases, the panel shall certify to the
commission the extent, if any, of the disability of the claimant from
performing work for renumeration or profit, and whether the sole cause of the
disability or death, in the opinion of the panel, results from the occupation
al disease and whether any other causes have aggravated, prolonged,'
accelerated, or in any way contributed to the disability or death, and if so,
the extent in percentage to which the other causes have so contributed.
(c) The commission shall promptly distribute full copies of the report to
the applicant, the employer, and its insurance carrier by registered mail with
return receipt requested. Within 15 days after the report is deposited in the
United States post office, the applicant, the employer, or its insurance
carrier may file with the commission written objections to the report. If no
written objections are filed within that period, the report is considered
admitted in evidence.

EXHIBIT A

(d) The commission may base its finding and decision on the report of the
panel, medical director, or medical consultants, but is not bound by the
report if other substantial conflicting evidence in the case supports a
contrary finding,
(e) If objections to the report are filed, the commission may set the
case for hearing to determine the facts and issues involved. At the hearing,
any party so desiring may request the commission to have the chairman of the
medical panel, the medical director, or the medical consultants present at the
hearing for examination and cross-examination. For good cause shown, the
commission may order other members of the panel, with or without the chairman
or the medical director or medical consultants, to be present at the hearing
for examination and cross-examination.
(f) The written report of the panel, medical director, or medical
consultants may be received as an exhibit at the hearing, but may not be
considered as evidence in the case except as far as it is sustained by the
testimony admitted.
(g) The expenses of the study and report of the medical panel, medical
director, or medical consultants and the expenses of their appearance before
the commission shall be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, (as last
amended by Chapter 116, Laws of Utah 1988)

R568-1-9 Guidelines for Utilization of Medical Panel.
Pursuant to Section 35-1-77, U.C.A., the commission adopts the
following guidelines in determining the necessity of submitting a
case to a medical panel:
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative
Law Judge where:
1. One or more significant medical issues may be
involved. Generally a significant medical issue must be
shown by conflicting medical reports.
Significant
medical issues are involved when there are:
(a) Conflicting medical reports of permanent
physical impairment which vary more than 5% of the
whole person,
(b)
Conflicting medical opinions as to the
temporary total cutoff date which vary more than 90
days, and/or
(c) Medical expenses in controversy amounting
to more than $2,000.
B. A hearing on objections to the panel report may be
scheduled if there is a proffer of conflicting medical
testimony showing a need to clarify the medical panel report.
Where there is a proffer of new written conflicting medical
evidence, the Administrative Law Judge may, in lieu of a
hearing, re-submit the new evidence to the panel for
consideration and clarification.
C. The Administrative Law Judge may authorize an injured
worker to be examined by another physician for the purpose of
obtaining a further medical examination or evaluation
pertaining to the medical issues involved, and to obtain a
report addressing these medical issues in all cases where:
1. The treating physician has failed or refused to
give an impairment rating,
2. The employer or doctor considers the claim to be
non-industrial, and/or
3. A substantial injustice may occur without such
further evaluation.
D. Any expenses of the study and report of a medical
panel or medical consultant and of their appearance, at the
hearing, as well as any expenses for further medical
examination or evaluation, as directed by the Administrative
Law Judge, shall be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance
Fund.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 90000895

KERRY WILLARDSON,
Applicant,

*

FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
BEAVER CREEK COAL COMPANY/
CIGNA and EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE
FUND,

AND ORDER

Defendants.
*
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

HEARING:

Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on February 26,
1991 at 1:00 o'clock p.m. Said hearing was pursuant
to Order and Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Barbara Elicerio, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The applicant was present
Virginius Dabney, Attorney..
The
defendants
were
Shaughnessy, Attorney.

and

was

represented

represented

by

Robert

by

J.

The Employers Reinsurance Fund was represented by Erie
Boorman, Administrator.
This case involves a claim for permanent total disability benefits
related to an April 15, 1988 industrial incident after which the applicant
experienced back and hip symptoms. The carrier has denied the claim and has
paid no medical expenses or compensation related to the April 15, 1988
incident. The carrier and the Employers Reinsurance Fund both stipulate to
the fact that the applicant is currently in a disabled status. However, the
carrier and the Fund argue that the applicant did not sustain a compensable
industrial injury on April 15, 1988 and thus he is not entitled to permanent
total disability benefits. In addition, the Employers Reinsurance Fund"argues
that even if he did sustain a compensable industrial injury on April 15, 1988,
his injury is not the cause of his permanent total disability status. As the
injury did not cause the disability, the Fund argues the applicant is not
entitled to permanent total disability benefits related to the injury, As
precedent for this argument, the Fund cites Large v. Industrial Commission,
758 P.2d 954 (Utah App. 1988).

EXHIBIT B
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FINDINGS OF FACT:
The applicant is a male who was 57 years old on the date of injury
and who had a spouse, but no minor children on that date. The applicant was
employed by Beaver Creek Coal Company on the date of injury, April 15, 1988,
and held the position of Belt Supervisor at the time. He was earning a wage
that would entitle him to the maximum rate for workers compensation benefits.
The April 15, 1988 industrial event was not the first time the applicant
experienced symptoms related to his back, and in the interest of giving a
chronological overview, the prior back related problems will be summarized
first.
The first back injury noted in the medical records submitted at
hearing is a December 9, 1970 industrial injury that the applicant sustained
while he was working for the Mid-Continent. Coal Company in Carbondale,
Colorado.
The only description of that injury in the medical records
indicates that the applicant stooped over to pick up a shuttle car cable and
felt a catch in his back. The applicant apparently was unable to straighten
up after this incident.
On August 31, 1971, the applicant underwent back
surgery at St. Luke's Hospital in Denver, Colorado. Actual hospital records
are not included in the medical record exhibit, but a later letter of the
treating surgeon. Dr. W. Gerber, indicates that the procedure performed was a
lumbar laminectomy at L5-S1. Per Dr. Gerber, the surgery was successful in
eliminating the right leg pain that the applicant experienced following the
December 9, 1970 injury. The applicant was later rated in 1972 at both 5% and
7% by different doctors, but it is unclear whether these ratings are the
equivalent of whole person ratings specified in the AMA Guides to the
Evaluation of Permanent Impairment.
The next reference to back problems in the medical record exhibit is
on July 8, 1983, when the applicant was seen at the Emery Medical Center for
back pain, bilateral shoulder pain and left hip pain. X-rays were taken of
the cervical and lumbar spine and were read to show as follows: Cervical spine
- mostly normal with some question of osteoarthritic changes and compromise of
the neuro foramina at C3-4; Lumbar spine - severe degenerative osteoarthritis
of the lumbar spine with multi-level degenerative disc disease and scoliosis.
The diagnosis of the examining physician was: severe osteoarthritis and
degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine. It is unclear what treatment
the applicant had at that time and what follow-up occurred.
On January 16, 1988, per records of Dr. D. Faust, D. C , the
applicant was at home hanging a ceiling fan when the ladder he was standing on
collapsed and he fell as a result. The applicant testified at hearing that he
was not really sure how he landed in this fall, but he believes he fell onto
his shoulder. Dr. Faust's diagnosis was thoraco-cervical strain/sprain, grade
II disc syndrome C5-6 with brachial extension neuralgia of the right shoulder
and arm as a direct complication.
The applicant was treated 8 times in
January 1988, 7 times in February 1988 and 4 times in March 1988 by Dr.
Faust,
The applicant testified at hearing that Dr. Faust only treated his
neck and shoulder and did not treat his low back.
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The next incident noted in the medical records is the April 15, 1988
industrial event at issue. As noted above, the applicant was employed with
Beaver Creek Coal Company on that date as a Belt Supervisor. This position
involved maintaining a conveyor belt that was approximately 1 and 1/2 miles
long. The belt was about waist-high for most of its length, but was shoulder
height for a portion of its total length, and was 3 feet overhead in places.
The applicant needed to keep the belt clean and this required shoveling under
the rollers to keep debris from building up. He normally worked 4 10-hour
days a week and overtime was normally involved.
On April 15, 1988, the
applicant was engaged in replacing wire mesh guards that were fastened to the
belt lengthwise, apparently to prevent rock running along the belt from
falling off the belt.
The guards were made of heavy wire mesh and were
approximately 4 feet by 8 feet in dimension. The applicant estimated that the
guards weighed about 20-25 pounds each. They were stacked in packages of 50
to 100 and bound together with straps. To reguard the belt, the guards needed
to be carried from the stack over to the belt and then had to be fastened to
the belt, apparently using wire and pliers. The applicant had been doing this
job for 2 or 3 days as of April 15, 1988.
He testified that he had no
problems with the job until April 15, 1988. He indicated that he had never
done the task before during his 2 to 3 years working on the belt, but that he
did hang chain link guarding on the belt at one time. The applicant stated
that he felt hanging the chain link was easier than the wire mesh.
The applicant had hung about 14 or 15 guards around mid-day on April
15, 1988. He estimated that it took from 5 to 15 minutes to hang a guard.
The applicant testified that he initially felt sharp back pain around mid-day
on April 15, 1988 when he was trying to free one of the guards from the stack
on the ground. The applicant explained that the guards were pressed together
in the stacks as a result of being bound by the straps. This caused the
guards to catch on each other, and to loosen the guard on the top of the
stack, the applicant needed to jerk at it to uncatch it. The applicant bent
over at the waist and grabbed onto the guard on top of the stack (apparently
with both hands) and jerked on it while straightening up and stepping back at
the same time. As he jerked it, pulling it up and away from the stack, he
felt a sharp pain about at the level of his belt in his low back.
The applicant did manage to free the guard and he dragged it over to
fasten it to the belt. After doing so, the applicant testified that he felt
he needed to lay down and he did so flat on his back. This helped somewhat.
Per the applicant, another employee was there at the time.
This was Owen
Hunt. The applicant stated that he did not immediately tell Hunt that he had
hurt his back, because he was in such pain at the time. At some point. Hunt
noticed the applicant laying down on the ground and, per the applicant. Hunt
helped him to his feet and into the tipple shack that was 6 or 8 feet away.
The applicant testified that he sat down on a metal tool box for about 10
minutes with the pain in his right hip and back increasing at this point. The
applicant then decided to lay down again and he laid down on a bench for about
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one hour. He finally decided he could not remain at work and he showered,
with some difficulty getting out of his clothes. The applicant testified that
Hunt helped him into Hunt's van and Hunt drove him to the home of a
chiropractor. Dr. Sanders. When he arrived there. Dr. Sanders did not provide
any treatment and just referred him to the Emery Medical Center.
The applicant saw Dr. K. Kotrady at the Emery Medical Center the same
day. Dr. Kotrady*s Physician's Initial Report of Work Injury indicates that
the injury occurred when the applicant was working and climbing up and down on
the drive, stretching and twisting, re-guarding the drive.
The pain he
noticed is listed as hip pain. Low back pain and hip pain is listed in the
complaints section, however, the section regarding the findings of the
examination indicates that the applicant had right hip pain in a number of
different positions, but that there was no back pain. An X-ray was taken and
was read by Dr. Kotrady to show: moderate to severe arthritic changes
involving lumbar spine and pelvis, multiple levels of osteophyte formation
with bridging across the discs, significant scoliosis beginning at L3, disc
space narrowing between Ll-2, L2-3, L3-4 and L4-5, facet sclerosis at these
levels as well, large osteophyte seen almost bridging between L5 and sacrum
and evidence of arthritic wear involving both hip joints. There is a final
note stating "I can determine no acute changes" (emphasis added).
Dr. Kotrady1s diagnosis was: right hip pain, severe degenerative
arthritis hips, pelvis and lumbar spine, degenerative disc disease all levels
of the lumbar spine and scoliosis.
Answering the question "Is condition
requiring
treatment
the
result
of
the
industrial injury or exposure
described?". Dr. Kotrady has marked both the yes and the no box and refers to
the comments section for explanation.
The explanation states: degenerative
arthritis and disc disease pre-existed this injury - X-ray evidence in 1983.
In Dr. Kotrady's office note of the same date, he notes that he felt the
applicant had compensated for his bad back by shifting the weight to his hips
and that the hip pain the applicant, was experiencing was secondary to
arthritis in the hips.
That note also states that Dr. Kotrady found no
evidence of back pain in his examination. He prescribed bed rest, heat/ice,
robaxin and apparently provided an injection of demerol/phenergan.
Dr.
Kotrady's follow-up note on April 19, 1988, indicates that the applicant's
right hip pain was a little better and that there was no back pain and full
range of motion in the back. His assessment on that date was: ligamentous
strain right hip, no back involvement. He indicates that the applicant could
return to work as of April 25, 1988.
The applicant was admitted to Castleview Hospital on April 23, 1988
for low back pain. The Admit History and Physical Exam report indicates that
the applicant had a chronic low back pain history. After recovery from the
1970 injury and surgery, the report indicates that the applicant was OK with
just occasional low back discomfort and no loss of work time resulting. The
applicant confirmed this at hearing and stated that he would have back pain
during those years only after doing a lot of bending.
The Admit History
Report
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indicates that the applicant was injured on April 15, 1988 climbing up and
down a drive using long steps. It notes that the applicant made a step and
twisted and felt pain in the right hip. The report states that the applicant
was feeling better, but when leaving Dr. Kotrady's office on April 19, 1988,
he simply turned and felt something twist and pull in his hip and the hip pain
reoccurred. Also indicated is the applicant's inability to stand in line at a
scout meeting that night because of worsened pain. Then it is noted that the
applicant's pain became markedly worse when he stooped to take something out
of the dryer on April 23, 1988. The applicant's complaints were noted as
mostly hip pain radiating into the groin, but also back pain. Right leg pain
that was noticed just after the industrial event had resolved per the Admit
Report.
A CT scan of the lumbar spine was taken on April 27, 1988 during the
applicant's
stay
in
the hospital.
It was read to show multi-level
degenerative and osteoarthritic changes in the lumbar spine, with some
indication of a possible herniation at L3-4.
The applicant was treated
conservatively at the hospital and the April 30, 1988 discharge summary
indicates that the applicant seemed to improve, but reached a plateau and
still had significant pain and discomfort in the hip with minimal ambulatory
functioning. The applicant followed up with Dr. D. Heiner in Castledale, Utah
after release from the hospital and Dr. Heiner apparently referred the
applicant to neurologist. Dr. L. Gaufin in Salt Lake City for a specialist
opinion. On May 5, 1988, Dr. Gaufin wrote Dr. Heiner explaining his findings
after the initial examination. Dr. Gaufin's letter describes the injury to
have occurred when the applicant was re-guarding a belt drive for about 5
hours, climbing 8 to 10 feet and reaching and stretching. Right hip pain and
severe right leg pain resulted per Dr. Gaufin. Dr. Gaufin's impression was:
1) acute lumbar radiculopathy L4-5, L3-4, right, secondary to degenerative
disc and joint disease with disc protrusion at L3-4, L4-5, right greater than
left and 2) chronic osteoarthritis and degenerative disc and joint disease
Ll-2, L2-3, L3-4, L4-5, L5-S1 bilaterally.
Dr. Gaufin comments that the
lumbar radiculopathy was secondary to the work-related injury on April 15,
1988.
After May 1988, Dr. Heiner followed up with the applicant every month
to two months through at least February of 1990. Dr. Heiner's follow-up notes
appear to show no real change in the applicant's overall condition and
symptoms during this time period. There are various incidents mentioned where
the applicant would exacerbate the pain causing it to increase in intensity
for a period of time. For the most part, it appears from the notes that the
pain would return to its normal level eventually.
The incidents include
washing 2 cars in July of 1988, putting up Christmas lights and falling in
December of 1988, reaching to hand something to his son and a turning/twisting
episode which required an emergency room visit in March 1989. Dr. Gaufin did
one other report dated December 21, 1988 which indicates radiation into the
right and left hip and left leg. That report states that the applicant was
unable
to
work
in
the
future
because
of
his
severe

ORDER
RE: KERRY WILLARDSON
PAGE SIX

degenerative process in the lumbar spine. Dr. Gaufin notes in that report
that the applicant was the same as when he had previous seen him in May of
1988 and that he would not improve. Dr. Gaufin states that the only goal was
to reduce the rate at which the applicant's joints wore out and to minimize
the severe crippling that might take place.
Both Dr. Gaufin and Dr. Heiner completed Summary of Medical Record
forms provided to them by counsel for the applicant. They are dated September
of 1988 and give impairment ratings for the applicant. Dr. Gaufin indicates
in his form that the applicant had a 15% whole person rating, with 1/2 being
due to pre-existing conditions and 1/2 due to the April 15, 1988 industrial
incident. Dr. Heiner indicates in his form that the applicant had a 30% whole
person rating, with 1/2 being due to pre-existing conditions and 1/2 due to
the April 15, 1988 industrial injury. The forms are very brief and do not
contain any explanatory breakdown regarding the ratings. At hearing, the
defendants argued that the ratings appear to be rather off-hand in simply
dividing up the pre-existing and industrial impairment 1/2 and 1/2. Counsel
for the applicant indicated that neither doctor had access to the applicant's
prior medical records when the ratings were assessed.
The applicant was questioned by the defendants at hearing regarding
his report of the industrial injury and his filing of a claim. The defendants
were concerned in particular that the medical records contain no reference to
an incident involving jerking on a screen. In addition, the defendants point
to a form the applicant completed for his attorney in August of 1988 (Exhibit
A-15). That form describes the injury as "reguarding belt drive with heavy
wire sheets, stepping up and down high places, stretching and bending.M The
applicant for the most part indicated he could not remember exactly what he
told the various doctors regarding how the injury occurred and he could not
recall whether he had told anyone regarding the incident with the screen.
Currently, the applicant stated he has low back discomfort, but not
the sharp pain he had experienced just after the April 15, 1988 work
incident. He stated the pain will become sharp 3 or 4 times per day and that
this never occurred prior to the April 15, 1988 incident. He stated that he
has a dull ache in his right thigh from the hip to the knee that he never had
to the current intensity before April 15, 1988. He also has a dull hurt in
his left buttocks that he stated comes and goes constantly and began sometime
after he came home from the hospital in 1988. He has been taking darvocet,
soma and prozac since April 15, 1988 and he wears a pelvic brace that Dr.
Heiner prescribed for him.
The applicant was awarded Social Security Disability beginning as of
April 15, 1988 for osteoarthritic lumbar spine and degenerative disc disease.
He also has received long term disability benefits by way of employer benefit
package which was effective as of October 16, 1988. The combined benefit from
the two comes to around $1,400.00 per month.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The Industrial Incident:
The preponderance of the evidence supports the following description
of the April 15, 1988 industrial incident: The applicant experienced hip pain
while re-guarding a belt on April 15, 1988 which involved lifting 20-25 pound
wire mesh screens or guards, measuring 4 feet by 8 feet, and fastening them to
the belt. The process involved some climbing, stretching and reaching and
possibly twisting motions.
All the medical records include some version of the above-stated
facts. The April 23, 1988 Castleview Hospital Admit History refers to an
incident where the applicant made a step and twisted with resulting hip pain.
This is the only place that description is found.
Only the applicant's
hearing testimony includes mention of jerking on a guard/screen.
It is
difficult to believe that such a definitive incident was never mentioned to
the physicians just after the incident, or that it was mentioned but never
noted by any of the physicians in their injury descriptions. In addition, it
is difficult to believe that the applicant did not even mention the screen
jerking to his attorney when he completed the form for his attorney in August
of 1988 (Exhibit A-15). The description listed in that form is much the same
as the description stated above and much the same as is indicated in the
medical records.
Therefore, the ALJ must dismiss the applicant's testimony
regarding the screen jerking and adopt the above-stated description of how the
symptoms began.
Compensable Industrial Injury:
Medical Cause:
It is clear that after April 15, 1988, the applicant began to seek
medical treatment for symptoms in the hip and back, and to a certain extent,
in the legs, that he either did not experience before April 15, 1988 or for
which he did not seek treatment prior to April 15, 1988. It is not clear that
the events of April 15, 1988 are the cause of those symptoms. Dr. Kotrady,
the doctor who saw the applicant on April 15, 1988 is clearly of the opinion
that the applicant's problems were pre-existing.
His records put heavy
emphasis on the hip pain and in several places he definitively states there
was no back pain. His explanation for the hip pain was arthritis of the hip
joints, confirmed by X-ray, that he believed was caused by a shifting, of
weight from the back to the hips as a result of the applicant's bad back. He
was unable to answer a definitive "yes" to whether the industrial injury
caused the symptoms he was treating and noted that degenerative disc disease
and the degenerative arthritis were pre-existing as confirmed in X-rays
pre-dating April 15, 1988. He read the April 15, 1988 X-rays to show no acute
changes. All of these things clearly point to the applicant's significant
pre-existing condition as being the cause of his need for treatment at that
point with no confirmation of contribution from the work activities of April
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In addition to Dr. Kotrady's records, there is the Castleview
Hospital records which do mention a unique version of an incident on April 15,
1988, but also mention several other incidents occurring after April 15, 1988
causing either hip or back pain. The hospital diagnoses match those of Dr.
Kotrady and Dr. Gaufin, in that they refer to extensive degenerative and
arthritic changes in the entire lumbar spine.
No acute herniations or
fractures are noted and the film readings match almost exactly the film
readings from 1983. Although Dr. Gaufin and Dr. Heiner both have indicated
that 1/2 of the applicant's lumbar spine impairment is due to the industrial
incident on April 15, 1988, the basis of these brief notations on the
fill-in-the-blank forms they completed for applicant's counsel has to be
questioned.
Dr. Gaufin saw the applicant only twice per the medical records
and he had no prior records for the applicant to review (per counsel for the
applicant).
His diagnosis of extensive degenerative and arthritic changes
with no acute changes seems to contradict a finding that 1/2 the applicant's
impairment is due to the April 15, 1988 activities.
Dr. Gaufin also later
notes that the applicant was unable to work due to the severe degenerative
process in his lumbar spine. Dr. Heiner also had no prior records to review
and also gives no explanation regarding how he arrived at the percentages he
has indicated.
In conclusion, the preponderance of the medical evidence strongly
suggests that the applicant's symptoms and disability after April 15, 1988
were the result of his long-standing and significant degenerative condition in
his lumbar spine and were not the result of any significant contribution by
the activities of April 15, 1988.
Legal Cause:
This issue need not be addressed as the failure to establish medical
cause prevents any finding of a compensable industrial injury.
Allen v.
Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986).
Merely as commentary, the
activities of April 15, 1988, as described at the beginning of the Conclusions
of Law, certainly do not clearly fall into the "unusual exertion" category.

ORDER:
IT IT THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant's claim for permanent
total disability benefits associated with the work activities of April 15,
1988 is dismissed with prejudice for failure to establish a compensable
industrial injury.
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The Industrial Commission of Utah (IC) reviews the Motion for
Review of applicant who requests that a review be made of the
administrative law judge's (ALJ) Order of March 18, 1991 in the
above captioned matter, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section
35-1-82.53 and Section 63-46b-12.
There is no question among the parties to this case that
applicant is disabled. However, the defendants argue that the
applicant did not sustain a compensable industrial injury. In
brief, the relevant facts follow.
On the date of the alleged injury, April 15, 1988, applicant
was 57 years old, and was employed by the Beaver Creek Coal
Company.
Applicant held the position of belt supervisor.
Applicant had back problems prior to the April 15, 1988 injury. In
1970, applicant injured his back while working for the MidContinent Coal Company in Colorado. He had a lumbar laminectomy at
L5-S1 for his problems in 1971, and he was rated in 1972 at five
percent and seven percent by different doctors.
In 1983 X-rays were taken in response to his complaints of
back pain, bilateral shoulder pain, and left hip pain. The X-rays
showed the following: Cervical spine was mostly normal with some
question of osteoarthritic changes and compromise of the neuroforamina at C3-4; and severe degenerative osteoarthritis of the
lumbar spine with multi-level degenerative disc disease and
scoliosis.
In 1988 applicant was treated 19 times during a three month
period after he fell at home while hanging a ceiling fan. The
diagnosis was thoraco-cervical strain/sprain, grade II disc
syndrome C5-6 with brachial extension neuralgia of the right
shoulder and arm as a direct complication.
On the date of the accident at issue in this case, the
applicant had been working on a job with the Beaver Creek Coal
Company for two to three years. He was replacing heavy wire mesh
EXHIBIT C
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guards on the belt. The guards were used to prevent rock from
falling off the belt. The guards were four feet by eight feet
long, weighed approximately 20-25 pounds each, and were stacked in
bound bundles of 50-100.
Applicant had been doing the guard
replacement for two to three days at the time of the accident.
On April 15, 1988, applicant had hung about 15 guards that
day, and while trying to free one of the guards from its stack by
jerking at it, applicant stated at the hearing that he felt a sharp
pain in his low back at about belt level. The applicant lay down
on the ground because of the pain, and another employee assisted
applicant into a nearby shack. Applicant reclined for about an
hour after which he showered, and was assisted into the other
employee's van. Applicant was driven to a chiropractor's home who
did not provide treatment, but instead referred applicant to the
Emery Medical Center where applicant was treated.
The ALJ found by a preponderance of the evidence that the
April 15, 1988 occurred as follows: "The applicant experienced hip
pain while re-guarding a belt on April 15, 1988 which involved
lifting 20-25 pound wire mesh screens or guards, measuring 4 feet
by 8 feet, and fastening them to the belt. The process involved
some climbing, stretching and reaching and possibly twisting
motions." Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, dated
March 18, 1991, at 7. The ALJ dismissed the applicant's testimony
that he had jerked the screen since "such a definitive incident was
never mentioned to the physicians just after the incident...." Id.
Further, the ALJ concluded that the symptoms and disability
after April 15, 1988 were the result of applicant's long standing
and significant degenerative condition in his lumbar spine, and
were not the result of any significant contribution by the
activities of April 15, 1988. Since she found no medical cause,
there was no compensable accident and Allen was not invoked. Allen
v. Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986).
We find that there is substantial evidence to support the
findings and conclusions of the ALJ in light of the whole record.
The treating physician on April 15, 1988 was clearly of the opinion
that the applicant's medical problems were preexisting.
That
physician explained the hip pain as being due to arthritis of the
hip joints.
The Castleview Hospital records of April 15, 1988 refer to
extensive degenerative and arthritic lumbar changes. No fractures
or acute herniations were found. The film readings from 1988 were
remarkably similar to those of 1983. No surgery was completed to
correct any problem allegedly aggravated by the April 15, 1988
injury.
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Applicant submitted two fill-in-the-blank documents from
Doctors7 Heiner and Gaufin. Both doctors had indicated that onehalf of applicant's lumbar spine impairment was caused by the
industrial accident of April 15, 1988. However, neither doctor had
applicant's prior records to review. Thus, their conclusions were
based on incomplete information, and can be discounted.
The ALJ determined that no medical cause existed based upon
the lack of probative evidence of a connection with the accident of
April 15, 1988. Applicant contends that the ALJ erred by not
appointing a medical panel. Appointment of a medical panel is
within the sound discretion of the ALJ as limited by U.C.A. Section
35-1-77 (1953 as amended), and R490-1-9 (Utah Admin. Code 1992).
Since there was no credible conflicting medical evidence, the ALJ
did not err in making her decision not to appoint a medical panel.
Applicant also asserts that the ALJ erred when she stated that
"Applicant's symptoms and disability after April 15, 1988 were the
result of his long-standing and significant degenerative condition
in his lumbar spine* and were not the result of any significant
contribution by the activities of April 15, 1988." Order of the
ALJ, at 8. He disputes her use of a standard of "significant
contribution." However, on the preceding page of her order, the
ALJ stated that there was "no confirmation of contribution from the
work activities of April 15, 1988." Id. at 7. Further, the ALJ
stated that the cause of applicants need for treatment on April
15, 1988 was his "significant pre-existing condition...." Id.
Thus, it appears that the ALJ determined that the applicant's
treatment on April 15, 1988 had nothing to do with his work, and
resulted entirely from his preexisting condition with no
contribution from his workplace labor. The use by the ALJ of
"significant" was therefore surplusage, and she did not use the
standard alleged by applicant.
Applicant also alleges that the ALJ looked at only one day's
activity, and failed to consider the cumulative effects of his
exertions over many years. The ALJ determined that the applicant's
rendition of how his alleged injury of April 15, 1988 occurred was
not credible. There was no support for applicant's rendition in
the records of his physicians. Thus, applicant did not meet his
burden. The ALJ considered the previous injuries, and determined
that applicant's injury was entirely preexisting, and did not occur
on April 15, 1988.
It is the opinion of the Commission that the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order of the ALJ are substantially correct
in law and fact in light of the entire file.
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ORDER:
IT IS ORDERED that the order of the administrative lciw judge
dated March 18, 1991 is affirmed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah
Court of Appeals within 30 days of the date hereof, pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53(2), 35-1-86, and 63-46b16. The requester shall bear all costs to prepare a transcript of
the hearing for appeals purposes.
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